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The politics of reactivity: Ambivalence in corporate responses to corporate social 
responsibility ratings 
 
Abstract 
Organizational ratings exude anxiety and allure, but relatively little is known about how 
managers balance resisting and mobilizing ratings. We explore this duality with a qualitative 
study on managerial responses to corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings. Based on 
interviews focused on CSR ratings with managers of 60 companies, we induce four responses 
to ratings: grumbling, contestation, cherry-picking and microstatactivism. We further show 
how managers combine resistance and mobilization in two ambivalent engagement modes. 
Our analysis contributes to the literature by developing a more nuanced theory of corporate 
responses to organizational ratings, which demonstrates the importance of ambivalence in 
managing institutional pressure.  
 
Keywords 
Corporate social responsibility – Grumbling – Politics – Ratings – Reactivity – Resistance – 
Statactivism  
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings, which quantify information regarding a firm’s 
corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies and practices into a 
comparable measure of performance, are becoming ever more important to target audiences 
today.i It is estimated that over 600 of such ratings exist globally (SustainAbility, 2019). 
Originally created for the benefit of niche investors interested in the CSR performance of 
investee companies (Déjean, Gond, & Leca, 2004; Waddock, 2008), surveys suggest that 
investors managing $30 trillion in assets may currently consider CSR ratings when making 
their investments (Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, 2018). The use of CSR ratings data is also 
popular in academic research (Eccles, Lee, & Stroehle, 2019; Gond, Vigneau, & Johnson-
Cramer, 2018), and the ratings are used by corporate managers to set strategic goals or 
showcase their CSR performance (Carlos & Lewis, 2018; Lewis & Carlos, 2019; Slager, 
Gond & Moon, 2012). 
Despite their evident popularity among these audiences, CSR ratings are both criticized 
and praised, much like ratings in other fields (Esposito & Stark, 2019) such as university 
education (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Sauder & Espeland, 2006; 2009). Ratings can be 
viewed as alleviating information asymmetries about aspects of performance that are difficult 
for outsiders to observe, thereby aiding organizations’ reputations and enhancing market 
transparency. At the same time, ratings have ‘disciplining effects’ (Foucault, 1978) that force 
organizations to try to conform to their measurements (Rindova, Martins, Srinivas, & 
Chandler, 2018). In the extant literature, these effects are captured by the mechanism of 
reactivity, according to which rated organizations seek to improve their performance in line 
with evaluation criteria (Espeland & Sauder, 2007), but which can also lead to ‘gaming’ 
where organizations decouple rated activities from actual performance or provide deceptive 
information to rating agencies (Espeland & Sauder, 2009; Sharkey & Bromley, 2015).  
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Research on CSR ratings shows that companies respond to being rated by improving 
their CSR performance when their initial performance is rated as subpar (Chatterji & Toffel, 
2010) or when surrounded by rated peers (Sharkey & Bromley, 2015). Such reactivity 
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007) may, in highly regulated industries, spill over to nonrated peers 
(Sharkey & Bromley, 2015), but this effect is dampened for companies that experience 
financial pressure (Rowley, Shipilov, & Greve, 2017). Recent insights suggest that 
companies whose performance is rated highly may respond by lowering their subsequent 
performance (Lewis, 2018) or deciding not to publicize their high ratings from a fear of being 
accused of hypocrisy (Carlos & Lewis, 2018). While it is clear from prior research that some 
companies seek to obtain favorable CSR ratings to secure reputational benefits, we have 
limited understanding of how corporate managers deal with the ‘anxiety’ and ‘allure’ exerted 
by CSR ratings (Espeland & Sauder, 2009, 2016). Therefore, we ask: How are CSR ratings 
resisted and/or mobilized by managers? 
We address this question through a qualitative inquiry informed by interviews held with 
managers of 60 international companies and by multiple sources of secondary data. We 
analytically induce four modes of managerial engagement with CSR ratings, grumbling, 
contestation, cherry-picking and microstatactivism, which we categorize as involving 
different levels of resistance and mobilization. Furthermore, we show that the four modes are 
not mutually exclusive, but rather that managers may employ multiple modes at the same 
time by combining modes across the spectrum of resistance and mobilization, suggesting an 
ambivalent response to CSR ratings. Finally, we explore how organizational characteristics 
influence these responses. 
Our study makes two main contributions. First, our results contribute to research on 
ratings and quantification (Mennicken & Espeland, 2019; Pollock, d’Adderio, Williams, & 
Leforestier, 2018) and specifically to studies of CSR ratings (Carlos & Lewis, 2018; 
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Clementino & Perkins, 2020; Rowley et al, 2017) by providing an extended repertoire of 
corporate reactivity to CSR ratings that includes previously overlooked dimensions such as 
grumbling and microstatactivism. Second, our analysis also extends studies of corporate 
reactions to institutional pressures (Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen, 2012; Oliver, 1991) by providing 
evidence of ambivalent managerial responses that combine resistance to ratings with their 
simultaneous mobilization. Such hybrid responses to institutional pressures can enrich the 
analysis of selective de/coupling (Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013). 
 
Ratings, commensuration and the politics of reactivity 
Contemporary organizations are subjected to an increasing number of ratings, rankings, and 
lists (Esposito & Stark, 2019; Pollock et al., 2018). Creating a rating involves 
commensuration—a process by which different entities are compared according to a common 
metric (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). This requires the elaboration of evaluation criteria to 
compare the performance of a given group of organizations. Commensuration can be based 
on qualitative data, but often requires quantification to facilitate comparison (Déjean et al., 
2014; Espeland & Stevens, 1998). 
Commensuration through ratings has been both criticized and praised. Ratings are 
commended for reducing information asymmetries regarding aspects of performance that are 
difficult to measure (Rindova et al, 2018) and as ‘social tests’ that might incentivize low 
ranked organizations or their peers to improve their performance (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; 
Sharkey & Bromley, 2015). Critics focus on the simplification of qualitative differences into 
quantitative scores or ranking positions, a lack of transparency regarding the evaluation 
criteria used, or a lack of predictive power based on historical data (Chatterji et al., 2009; 
Espeland & Sauder, 2016; Esposito & Stark, 2019). 
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The commensuration process underlying ratings leads to reactivity — ‘the idea that 
organizations change their behavior in reaction to being evaluated, observed, or measured’ 
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007: 1). Reactivity towards CSR ratings depends on company 
characteristics such as performance in the ratings (Carlos & Lewis, 2019; Lewis, 2019) and is 
subject to moderating effects such as financial performance (Rowley et al, 2017), the cost-
benefit trade-off of improving performance (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010) and the extent of 
industry-specific regulation (Sharkey & Bromley, 2015). 
Recent qualitative and theoretical work focused on fields in which multiple ratings for a 
similar feature coexist, such as in the CSR context, suggest that under such circumstances, 
ratings may be more actively resisted (Clementino & Perkins, 2020; Pollock et al., 2018). 
Such ‘plurality in the evaluative landscape’ will weaken reactivity due to uncertainty 
regarding relevant evaluation criteria and will reduce the power of status signals (Brandtner, 
2017). This invites a reconsideration of the politics of organizational responses to ratings, 
which involve both ‘anxiety’ (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996) induced by a mismatch between  
unique organizational features and standardized rating templates; and the ‘allure’ of 
showcasing good performance to external audiences (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). 
 
Anxiety: Resisting CSR ratings 
Even though ratings are so pervasive among organizations in our ‘neo-liberal’ society that 
they may seem irresistible (Bruno, Didier, & Vitale, 2014), individuals and organizations can 
and do engage in various forms of resistance to commensuration (Giamporcaro & Gond, 
2016; Rindova et al., 2018). Organizational resistance to ratings can take the form of 
‘gaming,’ whereby organizations provide incomplete or inaccurate information to the 
evaluator to improve their rating. Such gaming undermines the motivation behind evaluation 
criteria (Espeland & Sauder, 2007) as shown for example in a study of nursing homes in the 
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US, where higher reported staff numbers necessary to obtain high ratings did not lead to 
improvements in care outcomes (Ody-Brasier & Sharkey, 2019). Organizations not only 
‘internalize’ expectations from rating agencies (Espeland & Sauder, 2007) but also interpret 
rankings in ways that best serve their needs. They may seek to weaken a rating’s influence by 
providing competing narratives to their stakeholders (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Gerdin & 
Englund, 2019). 
 
Allure: Mobilizing CSR ratings 
Ratings not only invoke anxiety and resistance but also have allure (Espeland & Sauder, 
2009). Previous research drawing on impression management has shown that rankings are 
actively sought by management to impress external audiences (Carlos & Lewis, 2018; 
Elsbach & Kramer, 1992). Ratings can be used by managers to create ‘comparative 
orderings’ or to provide signals about status and reputation, which can create stratification at 
the field level (see Rindova et al., 2018, p. 2183). However, we know relatively little about 
the mobilization of ratings as a means to advance intraorganizational goals. 
Recent research in the sociology of quantification has coined the concept of 
‘statactivism’ (Bruno et al., 2014; Didier & Tasset 2013), which merges the notion of 
statistics and activism, to recast commensuration not only as a hegemonic neo-liberal 
tendency to be resisted but also as a potentially effective lever for emancipatory reform. 
Quantification can be regarded as an instrument for opening ‘possible worlds’ (Didier & 
Tasset, 2013). Activists may recast interpretations of official statistics to highlight the side 
effects of specific politics or may design alternative indicators to trigger political debate 
(Boltanski, 2014). In the context of corporate reactions to CSR ratings, the notion of 
microstatactivism suggests that ratings are not necessarily only a constraint weighing on 
8 
 
managers and employees, but that they could also be recast to serve progressive social change 
or advance distinct CSR agendas within organizations. 
In sum, the extant research on organization ratings in general and on CSR ratings in 
particular shows that ratings evoke both allure and anxiety. However, we have limited 
insights into how managers balance the anxiety and allure of ratings and how contingencies 
such as their rating performance or discrepancies between different ratings influence their 
responses through this balancing act. 
 
Research design, methods and data 
Given the lack of empirical evidence on resistance to ratings and our focus on how corporate 
managers perceive and react to CSR ratings, we adopted a qualitative research design 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2017, p. 26). We focused on managers in charge of responding to 
various CSR ratings. Due to the nature of our inquiry, we focused on publicly held 
corporations, as they are usually subjected to the scrutiny of socially responsible investors 
and thus heavily solicited by social rating agencies (e.g. MSCI and Sustainalytics) and/or 
CSR stock-market indices (e.g. the Dow Jones Sustainability Index [DJSI] and FTSE4Good). 
Following a logic of theoretical sampling, we did not aim to yield a statistically 
representative sample but rather tried to capture diverse reactions to CSR ratings by 
examining multinational corporations (MNCs) headquartered in a variety of countries and 
industries (Yin, 2017). 
In doing so, our sample reflects the fact that emerging market firms are underrepresented 
in CSR ratings. The resulting lack of pressure also means that these firms have been 
relatively unaware of ratings and/or have not responded to interview requests. Equally, while 
we managed to speak to respondents whose firms had dropped out of the CSR stock indices, 
our sample does not include firms that have never been rated and does not feature laggard 
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CSR firms.ii CSR ratings cover relatively large, liquid firms, which is reflected in our sample 
(mean firm size measured by the number of employees is 74,769). The majority of our 
respondents come from European countries. Table 1 provides more descriptive information 
about our respondents and firms. 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Data collection 
Our core dataset consists of 63 interviews with 75 managers in charge of responding to CSR 
ratings at 60 MNCs. The interviews were conducted through two distinct rounds of 
interviewing: one focused on how corporations manage stock market indices such as the 
FTSE4Good index while the other was dedicated to measuring corporate responses to 
external requests from financial actors about CSR. The respondents were identified through 
intermediary databases, e.g., based on their inclusion in CSR stock markets indices, and 
approached simultaneously within each round of interviews. The interviewees were 
functional managers or executives (more than half of our sample reported directly to a board 
or were members of board committees) in charge of managing requests from financial actors 
and CSR ratings and held job titles such as ‘sustainability officer’ or ‘Director of CSR,’ 
although some were based in investor relations or other departments of their organizations. 
During both interview campaigns, we asked managers open-ended questions about how 
they managed requests from investors in the domains of CSR and sustainability. Although the 
second campaign did not initially include any specific questions about CSR ratings, most of 
the managers used the interviews, perhaps strategically as a form of ‘political action’ 
(Alvesson, 2003), as an opportunity to express their concerns and grievances regarding CSR 
rating agencies. Therefore, we progressively included more follow-up open-ended questions 
about this topic. The interviews, which lasted approximately one hour, were recorded and 
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fully transcribed. When rereading the transcripts from both interview campaigns, we realized 
that issues related to CSR ratings were covered in depth by almost every interviewee. We 
therefore decided to focus our analysis of this rich empirical material on the topic of 
‘corporate responses to CSR ratings.’ 
To complement our interview data and gain a better sense of each corporate position and 
context in relation to CSR and CSR ratings, we also collected relevant company documents 
such as sustainability and/or annual reports in addition to secondary data from third-party 
sources. We collected data on CSR performance from Asset4, MSCI, and Sustainalytics. We 
also collected data on company characteristics (e.g. size, location, and industry) from Orbis. 
We use these secondary data to triangulate information about the positioning of our 
respondents in their organizations and to specify the various characteristics of the 
interviewees’ corporations. 
 
Data analysis 
Once we identified managerial responses to CSR ratings as a central topic of our inquiry, our 
analysis followed a standard structured process of analytical induction in line with the so-
called ‘Gioia method’ (Gioia et al., 2013). First, we remained as close as possible to our 
interviewees’ perspectives and engaged in open coding to capture all facets of their activities 
and viewpoints. Through this procedure, we first generated numerous provisional codes that 
captured the views of the interviewees (e.g. ‘rating agencies are painful middlemen’) and that 
corresponded to ‘first-order codes.’ Second, for axial coding (Locke, 2001), we identified 
recurring patterns in the corpus and abstracted sentences into ‘second-order themes.’ For 
instance, complaints about CSR ratings that were generic in nature (e.g. ‘it takes many time 
to answer all the questions’) were grouped under a theme labeled ‘complaining about 
commensuration overload.’ Another pattern we distinguished focused on the use of CSR 
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ratings by investors or their uselessness in contrast with direct discussions with 
shareholders—critiques that we label ‘voicing concerns about commensuration utility.’ 
Third, in moving back and forth between data and theory, we progressively subsumed 
distinct themes under theoretical aggregate constructs corresponding to more conceptually 
informed categories. For instance, building on Levin and Espeland (2002), we were able to 
distinguish contestation of ‘technical commensuration’—criticizing the method and/or data 
used by CSR ratings (i.e. the process by which ratings are produced)—from contestation of 
‘cognitive commensuration’—when target companies contested their membership to a 
specific category (i.e. how suitable a rating template is for their specific company and in 
particular the industry group that they are compared to). While we initially focused on 
constructs from the literature on responses to ratings (Rindova et al., 2018), we found that 
only some of our second-order themes corresponded to practices documented in this literature 
(e.g. cherry-picking engagement with ratings and contestation of rating outcomes). We 
therefore had to broaden our theoretical scope to account for two types of activities related to 
ratings. On one hand, we had expressions of generic complaints that did not neatly 
correspond to the forms of contestation discussed in prior studies. In reading the literature on 
resistance to the adoption of new technologies, we realized that such complaints correspond 
to a managerial equivalent of ‘employees’ grumbling’ (Laumer, Maier, Eckhardt, & Weitzel, 
2014), which can be defined as ‘resistance behavior expressed in conversations’ (Mahmud, 
Ramayah, & Kurnia, 2017, p. 1625). We therefore labeled these themes as ‘grumbling.’ On 
the other hand, we identified forms of the political mobilization of ratings that resonate, in a 
microscale context, with what French sociologists of quantification have recently coined 
‘stat-activism’ (see Bruno et al., 2014) or a reliance on statistics to promote social change. 
We therefore labeled these practices as ‘microstatactivism.’ 
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Figure 1 presents the data structure resulting from our inductive analysis. Table 2 
provides supplementary illustrations of our data. The first part of our findings section 
describes these four aggregate constructs in more detail. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 & TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Once we identified these four aggregate constructs, we also analyzed the extent to which 
managers drew on both sides of the resistance/mobilization duality. This enabled us to 
conceptualize the ‘ambivalent’ management of CSR ratings, as we found that responses were 
often used conjointly. To further explore these insights, we analyzed in depth two specific 
ambivalent patterns of responses: a ‘cynical’ response to ratings that combines grumbling 
with cherry-picking and a ‘pragmatic’ response that combines contestation with 
microstatactivism. We focused on these two modes of engagement, as they combine elements 
of mobilization and resistance and therefore represent ambivalent approaches to CSR ratings. 
We furthermore explored the extent to which respondents and company characteristics 
identified in Table 1 were contingent for corporate responses to CSR ratings. Our second 
findings section specifies ambivalent responses and highlights the organizational 
characteristics that appear to be contingent to these responses. 
 
Four managerial responses to CSR ratings 
Grumbling 
The most evidenced response to CSR ratings is grumbling: a low mobilization, low resistance 
response that involves a denigration of work involved in the production of ratings: it involves 
complaining about commensuration overload. In our case, such grumbling may be 
‘contagious’ in the sense that it predominantly takes place among peers and is not overtly 
addressed to CSR ratings: 
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If you get three or four CSR managers from big FTSE100 corporates in the pub together, 
at some point, we will all engage in a joint rant about how resource hungry these things 
[the CSR ratings and rankings] are and about how little value they bring to us. I think it 
is at the top of our minds at the moment. (MNC 6) 
Complaints voiced by managers in charge of responding to CSR ratings are related to the 
time-consuming nature of providing data and to the fact that the number of CSR ratings has 
substantially increased over the last two decades. Notably, all of the studied companies have 
devoted at least some resources to responding to CSR ratings, and many have seen the total 
amount of time spent on such ratings grow in recent years due to more frequent demands for 
information and data (see also Table 2 for supplementary evidence): 
Just to give you a rough idea [of the time and resources expended], we are about to enter 
in marching order from March 30, and for a period of two full months, we are going to 
respond to Robecco SAM, which we consider, together with Vigeo, to be the most 
important CSR rating agency for us. (MNC 51) 
In addition to complaints made about the time-consuming nature of responding to CSR 
ratings and the multiplicity of CSR ratings, grumbling also takes the form of a generic 
contestation of the utility of information generated by rating agencies and thus involves 
voicing concerns about commensuration utility. Such concerns relate to the use of CSR 
ratings by investors for capital allocation purposes. Here we find a range of managerial 
beliefs ranging from an acceptance of CSR ratings as a taken-for-granted source of 
information for investors to more challenging, if not radically skeptical attitudes: 
I believe that investors look at key ratings agencies like FTSE4Good and take their 
findings on board. What I would like to find out from investors and from FTSE4Good is 
empirical evidence to support that. But that’s my belief, for the time being… until proved 
otherwise. (MNC 8, emphasis in the original citation) 
They [the CSR rating agencies] claim to, sort of, have the ear of some investors, as a sort 
of benchmark study for them to see how good different companies are. I seriously 
question that, and if it were just me, and not the company I worked for, I would actually 
sort of be more resistant and stop filling them in, because if you don’t fill them in, then 
they lose traction, if everyone else follows my suit. (MNC 6) 
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As grumbling responses are conversational, they do not always translate into active 
resistance. However, they are widely shared among our interviewees and may become 
systemic in nature as a standard item of discussion among corporate CSR professionals. 
 
Contesting 
Contesting seeks to confront CSR commensuration in a more upfront manner and involves 
the elaboration of focused and sophisticated arguments to criticize and resist CSR ratings. We 
find managers contesting technical commensuration by discussing the capacity for ratings to 
‘actually’ measure CSR performance. Attacks on and resistance to the technical dimension of 
commensuration focus on the accuracy, methodological rigor, and robustness of the 
commensuration process. For example, CSR managers directly voice criticisms of rating 
agencies in terms of the data used to determine their companies’ ratings. These managers 
problematize reliance on media reports as a source of data that can be used in ratings, 
claiming that these reports may be outdated or unrepresentative of their companies’ actual 
performance or recent progress in CSR-related domains: 
You could say that perhaps some of the [CSR] ones aren’t quite as well thought through 
and have a tendency to rely on things like, you know, media headlines rather than 
company releases. I think that can be damaging because it completely ignores all the 
market information that companies put out, which has to be accurate because it goes to 
the stock exchange. There is also a sort of overemphasis on local newspaper headlines 
and this sort of thing, which… in my view, doesn’t quite capture the tone of the debate. 
(MNC 14) 
Managers not only question the data sources that CSR ratings are based on but also 
frequently deem methods used to convert company specific CSR data into comparative 
ratings ‘not terribly robust’ (MNC 6) and as doing ‘things that are slightly crazy’ (MNC 52) 
in terms of identifying relevant evaluation parameters for CO2 emissions, for instance. Some 
managers had questioned the overall outcomes of ratings with raters directly. One company 
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manager recounts that his/her company once threatened rating agencies with legal action after 
receiving a rating that the company felt was not representative of its performance. 
I think the thing with the agencies is, what we have tended to find is, that the people 
doing the analysis bring their own prejudice into it. They are not objective. We have had 
a number of conversations with them where they started with the point of view that all 
defense companies are bad companies and then they reflected this in their report and 
looked for the media stories to support this. So, this is not an objective assessment. There 
have been a few times when we have actually threatened them with legal action because 
we think their misrepresentation is so bad. That tends to scare them into actually taking 
out the offending statements. We do not use this very often, but if there is something that 
we think is downright untrue, then we will challenge it. (MNC 10) 
Another variant of this approach used by a more limited number of companies involves 
contesting cognitive commensuration or criticizing how the conversion of data into ratings 
applies to them. In the case of CSR ratings, companies are mostly rated on criteria that are 
industry specific. This means that conglomerate companies that cross multiple industry 
sectors or that employ a different business model from those of industry peers do not fit the 
industry ‘template’ and are penalized for this in the rating. 
[The CSR ratings] take a bit of a ‘one size fits all’ approach, because of course, they 
cannot do something specific for each corporation, but our core business is very different 
from that of the other companies we are compared to. (MNC 21) 
Beyond such complaints about industry classifications, CSR managers of French 
corporations (e.g. MNC 18; MNC 21; and MNC 52) also question the fact that several CSR 
ratings adopt an ‘Anglo-American’ type of categorization that fails to capture important 
continental European features, especially in domains such as diversity or governance. As a 
result, some questions posed by these ratings appear to be loosely relevant, if not totally 
irrelevant, in light of local legal frameworks. Other companies have placed statements on 
their websites explaining their contestation of rating agencies, such as: ‘We work hard to 
engage with both investors and [CSR] research agencies to explain when our information 
does not fit neatly into a survey or standard question set.’iii 
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Cherry-picking 
Cherry-picking is usually performed by deciding to selectively engage with specific CSR 
ratings and/or with the sub-dimensions of a given CSR rating. Such a response has elements 
of both resistance and mobilization.iv One form of cherry-picking involves benefiting from 
the plurality of ratings. Our analysis shows that when considering which CSR ratings to 
respond to, managers will weigh up the characteristics of a given rating, such as its 
legitimacy, the saliency of its clients and their expected performance and the fit between 
rating criteria and CSR strategies and policies. For example, absolute benchmarks such as the 
FTSE4Good Index are considered ‘easier to meet’ than those of an index such as the DJSI, 
which uses ‘relative’ benchmarks and only includes top performing firms. 
Cherry-picking is not only used to decide whether to deal with specific CSR ratings but 
also to gain the most from a specific rating through gaming by selecting rating inputs and/or 
outputs. For example, one manager recounts that if rating criteria are not considered relevant 
and no accurate company-level data exist, more limited information is provided to the rating 
agency rather than spending resources gathering company-level data: 
So, we try to temper what we give and we try to be as helpful as we can to, you know, 
Dow Jones, the FTSE4Good and other compilers of indices, but do not necessarily go to 
the lengths that they might want us to go to. We do not have a global data center for all 
of our employment data, so we rely on 55 different systems in different countries for that 
data, and it would be impossible for us to provide data across the 55 countries for, you 
know, the proportion of the workforce doing this, that or the other. So, what we tend to 
do then is take the [home country] as a barometer and still comply with the requests, but 
we do so with a specific country only (MNC 19). 
Interestingly, several managers suspect such gaming behavior to be present in peer 
companies (see Table 2 for more exemplary evidence). In the context of multiple CSR 
ratings, gaming also involves selectively communicating only on the best ratings externally. 
Managers from some corporations may decide to mobilize only CSR ratings on 
environmental performance, for example, if these are considered more strategic or if a 
company has stronger performance in the environmental domain relative to its policies and 
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practices around social issues. Most CSR ratings provide grades or quantified indicators on 
multiple dimensions of CSR performance, and several corporations included in our sample 
report only on the dimensions in which they dominate their peers. 
 
Microstatactivism 
We found managers to mobilize CSR ratings to advance their own CSR-focused agendas 
within their organizations following a logic of ‘microstatactivism.’ One form of 
microstatactivism involves mobilizing comparative orderings for change to use ratings to 
benchmark against peers or track performance over time. 
We use the rankings to compare ourselves to the companies in our peer group and in this 
way, we see how many points we get on the criteria, on the different criteria. Then we 
say okay, we… this is the area that we have to work on and this area is the most 
important for our company. (MNC 57) 
This often involves company managers seeking to remain proactively involved with 
rating agencies not only to gain insights into ratings of their own performance but also to be 
aware of changes to rating methodologies that may affect performance outcomes. 
Microstatactivism also involves leveraging CSR ratings to internally obtain more power 
or resources by enrolling ratings in calculative lobbying. For example, CSR ratings are used 
to convey a company’s performance in CSR to senior management, especially if limited 
awareness or knowledge of the topic exists at the board level. Managers point to the rating 
criteria as ‘objective’ measures requested by external audiences. Interestingly, we found that 
both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ratings offer equally useful levers for managers to internally progress 
CSR. On one hand, underperformance relative to peers provides welcome pressure to justify 
an increase in CSR-related resources. One manager recalls what happened after his/her 
company lost its place on the DJSI, a rating that only includes the top scoring companies in 
each industry sector: 
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Actually, not last year but the year before, we made it into the Dow Jones World [Index], 
we were actually number four and not number three, not in the top three, and there was 
quite a lot of discussion as a consequence of that. The board and actually the owners of 
the company felt that actually it was… they took it very personally, I have to say. 
Incredibly personally. And then last year [they said], you know, ‘You will get us back in, 
won’t you? Whatever resources you need you can just… you can use whatever name you 
need to get the information, this is the highest priority.’ (MNC 47) 
On the other hand, good performance is also used as a lever to maintain access to 
resources or improve managerial status. Positive company performance according to CSR 
ratings is systematically communicated to senior management. For some CSR managers, 
maintaining favorable rankings is an explicit part of personal performance objectives; we 
found numerous managers to use microstatactivism behavior to internally further their 
personal or professional objectives, interests, and status. 
The only tangible criteria that I get [to monitor our CSR performance in the eyes of 
investors and board members], this is thanks to CSR rating agencies. […] I can see 
whether we are in the rankings such as the FTSE4Good, I mean within a certain number 
of such indices, for instance. Now, we have just entered an MSCI index on sustainability. 
So, we are very happy to have good ratings from a CSR rating agency, because it 
demonstrates that our efforts are worth pursuing. Especially for the investors of a 
company like ours, this is one of the only ways to show [to board members] the payoffs 
of our investments in CSR. (MNC 54) 
Ambivalence and contingencies of managerial responses to CSR ratings 
We classified the four responses according to the extent of mobilization and resistance and 
located them within each one of the four quadrants in Figure 2. In analyzing the interactions 
between these responses, we identified two cross-cutting responses corresponding to 
ambivalent forms of management of CSR ratings in the sense that they combine forms of 
political mobilization and resistance to ratings. We label them ‘cynical’ and ‘pragmatic’ 
ambivalent responses. Figure 2 displays these responses. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
----------------------------------------------- 
Although one could expect managers to be oriented towards either anxiety or allure, in our 
interview data we find managers to draw on multiple or even all responses. When we test the 
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covariance between responses (results shown in Appendix A), we find positive covariance 
between the four dimensions of responses that we can identify. Overall, these results suggest 
that the four responses identified above are not mutually exclusive. We focus on the most 
ambivalent responses, which combine elements of mobilization and resistance. The 
covariance for cherry-picking and stat-activism is also relatively high, but since this involves 
the combination of two responses high in mobilization, we do not discuss this further. 
A combination of microstatactivism and contesting reflects a pragmatic engagement with 
the dual politics of commensuration. During his interview, a CSR manager from an energy 
MNC headquartered in Europe, for instance, mentions first how time-consuming the rating 
exercise is, which is described as a ‘gigantic pain’ (a form of generic grumbling), before 
actively contesting by pointing to several issues inherent to the interpretations and methods of 
various CSR ratings agencies. However, soon after he recognizes that these ratings serve as 
‘an extraordinary stimulus to launch our policies of global performance,’ as the company’s 
supportive board wants the company to be ‘ever ahead’ of its competitors (MNC 51). 
Focused contestations of rating agencies can be seen here as a corollary of this manager’s 
dependence on the presence of CSR rating agencies to secure executive support through 
microstatactivism. Such a pragmatic response was found in 45% of cases and was more likely 
to be reported for firms with high CSR performance (X2 (1, N = 60) = 8.91, p = .000), and for 
those showing discrepancies between different CSR ratings (X2 (1, N = 56) = 11.124, p = 
.002). 
The co-occurrence of cherry-picking and grumbling, which is also frequent (45% of 
cases), expresses a more cynical engagement with the dual politics of commensuration. Here, 
grumbling is combined with cherry-picking responses, such as benefiting from the plurality 
of ratings. We interpret this response as cynical, as it involves using an instrumental approach 
to enhance rating outcomes, while ratings are at the same time interpreted as a nuisance. For 
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example, a respondent from one North American-based MNC from the retail industry 
reported that the ratings had become a distraction and that his/her company had decided to 
put less effort into responding to the different rating agencies and more effort into its CSR 
programs. This led to a selection exercise where only the ratings deemed ‘professional’ were 
responded to (a cherry-picking response); all other rating agencies were told to obtain 
relevant information from the company’s website. Other companies have placed statements 
on their websites indicating which rating agencies they choose to respond to and why. We 
found no evidence of a statistically significant difference in reported frequencies of this 
cynical response across our cases.v 
 
Discussion, implications and conclusions 
We opened this paper by asking how CSR ratings are resisted and/or mobilized by managers. 
Through a qualitative analysis of interviews held with managers who interface with CSR 
rating agencies, we induced four distinct types of responses—grumbling, contesting, cherry-
picking and microstatactivism—that combine the mobilization of and resistance to ratings. 
We then identified how organizations had combined these responses through pragmatic and 
cynical engagement with ratings (see Figure 2). The findings offer a number of insights for 
the analysis of corporate responses to ratings and for studying ambivalent responses to 
institutional pressures, which we discuss before specifying the limitations and managerial 
implications of our study.  
 
Opening the black box of responses to CSR ratings 
Our analysis first contributes to the analysis of organizational reactivity (Mennicken & 
Espeland, 2019; Pollock et al, 2018) and specifically to studies focused on CSR ratings 
(Carlos & Lewis, 2018; Clementino & Perkins, 2020) by opening the ‘black box’ of reactivity 
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to CSR ratings. While previous studies on ratings and reactivity have outlined that 
commensuration leads to both anxiety and allure (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Sauder & 
Espeland, 2009), the research on CSR ratings has mainly focused on external organizational 
outcomes of reactivity such as improvements in CSR scores. Our results provide further 
insights into the ways in which managers seek to balance the allure and anxiety exerted by 
CSR ratings and show the extended repertoire of responses being used to do so.  
At one extreme, our results reveal the potential importance of grumbling. Although 
grumbling may seem anodyne or innocuous, as it does not involves high levels of 
mobilization or resistance (see Figure 2), prior information technology studies (Laumer et al., 
2014) suggest that grumbling can nevertheless hinder the adoption of new software through 
its contagious effects. While most managers interviewed that were grumbling saw CSR 
ratings as a ‘necessary evil,’ this could result in more active resistance over time. We found 
some anecdotal evidence for this trend. One of our interviewees with a grumbling response 
warned that s/he was considering no longer responding to the most demanding CSR rating 
agencies. Follow-up research showed that the case company has since published a statement 
announcing its decision to decline participation with certain rating agencies. Future research 
could explore further whether and how CSR managers’ grumbling may lead to more 
sophisticated and overt forms of resistance to specific CSR rating agencies. 
At the other extreme, we identify the managerial use of CSR ratings for internal political 
purposes in the form of microstatactivism. This response has not received much attention in 
prior analyses of CSR ratings or in the broader domain of reactivity to rankings. The idea that 
CSR performance, which relates to corporate practices for which often only qualitative 
information is available, can be quantified into a set of numbers comparable across firms was 
not generally contested in our setting. Ratings perpetuate and strengthen the ‘ideology of 
numbers’ (Chelli & Gendron, 2013) in CSR reporting practices. We show that this 
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quantitative nature of CSR ratings is precisely what makes these ratings useful for managers 
when mobilizing them through microstatactivism responses. Statactivism has thus far been 
used by sociologists to capture the mobilization of quantified information to further the 
causes of groups that may feel marginalized; to develop and inform a critique of society; or to 
use commensuration as a tool in power struggles (Boltanski, 2014). Our analysis shows that 
CSR ratings can operate as intraorganizational political tools that could be used by CSR 
managers to promote specific projects. Prior studies of rankings have focused on negative 
disciplining effects such as the repurposing of work activities in line with ranking criteria that 
may not add value to the mission of the ranked organization (Espeland & Sauder, 2016; 
Power, Scheytt, Soin, & Sahlin, 2009). Here, we find that CSR ratings may be used in 
intraorganizational politics to further CSR policies and practices. This is consistent with 
Gond and Nyberg’s (2017) argument that materialized forms of CSR can be repurposed to 
promote collective rather than solely corporate welfare. Other ratings such as the recently 
launched Corporate Human Rights Benchmark (CHRB) could move from an ‘engine of 
anxiety’ (Espeland & Sauder, 2016) to become a ‘performativity engine’ (Leca, Gond, & 
Barin-Cruz, 2014), encouraging the corporate management of issues such as human rights. Of 
course, the emancipatory potential of microstatactivism can be delivered only if managers 
responding to ratings do not ‘capture’ this potential of ratings only for their own benefits, as 
illustrated by Mun and Jung’s (2018) study on gender diversity. Future studies could analyze 
these political dynamics by closely following trends of CSR ratings within assessed 
organizations as suggested by Ben Khaled and Gond (2020) in relation to ethical regulations. 
Studies of reactivity to rankings (Mennicken & Espeland, 2019; Pollock et al, 2018) could 
build on our results to further analyze how rankings equip actors in ways that enable various 
forms of microstatactivism within organizations.  
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Ambivalent responses to institutional pressures 
Our results also confirm and extend insights from institutional studies of organizational 
responses to wider environmental pressures that extend beyond ratings (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Oliver, 1991; Sharkey & Bromley, 2015). First, our repertoire of managerial responses 
point to forms of mobilization and resistance extending beyond those frequently identified in 
the literature. Although contestation can be seen as a type of ‘challenge’—a ‘vocal and active 
departure from rules, norms or expectations’ (Oliver, 1991, p. 156)—and cherry-picking 
overlaps with tactics related to ‘avoidance’ (e.g. concealing nonconformity by reporting 
partial information) as well as to ‘compromise’ (e.g. using only the most flattering scores 
from CSR ratings), our two other responses extend this repertoire. Grumbling, despite being a 
symbolic rather than substantive form of resistance, makes explicit the questioning of the 
usefulness and the rationality of ratings (Clementino & Perkins, 2020). Microstatactivism 
suggests that an externally perceived acquiescence to institutional pressures may be explained 
by the interests of internal actors seeking to use specific demands from the institutional 
environment to enhance their own status or initiatives within their organizations. Such a 
subversion of external pressures for internal micropolitical purposes blends elements of 
acquiescence and manipulation, two responses originally conceptualized as distinct by Oliver 
(1991). Further research could explore how microstatactivism in other contexts may 
contribute to a ‘seeping in’ of external institutional pressure and pay close attention to how 
microstatactivism may mediate organization-level outcomes in relation to such pressures 
(Weber & Weager, 2017, p. 886). 
Second, by stressing the role of ambivalence in organizational responses to institutional 
pressures, our analysis connects early and recent insights from institutional theory on the 
nature of decoupling. Meyer and Rowan (1977) already envisioned that the organizational 
search for conformity with ‘rationalized myths’ would often be at odds with efficiency 
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demands, creating situations in which organizations would react ambivalently. More recently, 
it has been recognized that selective coupling or ‘the purposeful enactment of selected 
practices among a pool of competing alternatives’ ‘to satisfy symbolic concerns’ (Pache & 
Santos, 2013, pp. 993-994) helps hybrid organizations navigate contradictory institutional 
pressures (Pache & Santos, 2010). Our analysis shows that such ambivalent responses can be 
driven not only by the will to project external conformity (Pache & Santos, 2013) but also by 
internal political interests. Cynical and pragmatic engagements can explain the forms of 
decoupling observed by Crilly et al. (2012) in the CSR domain, as firms: 
‘decouple their behaviour from stated commitments not only for intentional, exploitative 
reasons, but also as a result of uncoordinated, exploratory attempts to respond to diverse 
and conflicting demands in a generally well-intended ‘muddling through’ process’ 
(p. 1443). 
Our results suggest that managers’ ambivalence, and the resulting combination of 
resistance and mobilization, may explain such forms of ‘muddling through’ above and 
beyond a lack of internal coordination. As a possible explanation for this ambivalence, the 
mobilization of CSR ratings through microstatactivism may create a form of dependence, 
which would also increase managers’ contestation of the same ratings as they feel more 
pressured to enhance their rating quality or mitigate rating discrepancies. 
 
Limitations and perspectives for future research 
While managerial responses to ratings and their ambivalence identified here can be used to 
explore organizational responses to other types of ratings, the generalizability of our results is 
bounded by the nature of our research design and by our global take on corporate responses. 
In relation to the study’s design, we prioritized the number of firms over the number of 
respondents per firm, which may have led to the generation of incomplete information, as 
managers within the same organization may share different views about the usefulness of 
CSR rating agencies. In addition, our sample is biased towards sustainability/CSR managers, 
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and the insights of these actors could contain social desirability bias. Finally, while our 
results suggest that relational dynamics between firm managers and rating agencies may also 
drive managerial responses and/or their combination, our study focuses only on managerial 
responses and does not take social rating agency actors into account. Future studies could 
analyze in more depth the microlevel interactions that occur between CSR rating agencies 
and rated firms to further unpack the relational dynamics underlying organizational reactivity 
to ratings. 
In addition, we did not systematically explore whether responses to CSR ratings reflect 
the various institutional systems within which corporations operate. However, a key insight 
of the research on comparative CSR (Brammer et al., 2012) that the home institutional 
environments and historical legacies influence forms of CSR (for a contrast, see, e.g. 
Kinderman, 2012 for the UK and Marens, 2012 for the US) may also apply to the criteria that 
rating agencies use to measure CSR performance. Early theoretical work on differences in 
CSR across national business systems (Matten & Moon, 2008) identified CSR ratings as a 
driver of a more explicit form of CSR, and such ‘explicitization’ seems to have been 
unabated in recent years (Matten & Moon, 2020). Future studies could expand our analysis 
by documenting how features of national business systems interact with corporate 
characteristics to explain managerial responses to CSR ratings. 
 
Managerial Implications 
By exploring the intraorganizational complexities underlying corporate responses to ratings 
and providing empirical evidence of ambivalent uses within organizations, our study has 
implications for three groups of actors that participate, directly or indirectly, in CSR ratings. 
The first group includes managers in charge of responding to CSR ratings. One source of 
managers’ complaints about such ratings is their multiplicity, making participation in all 
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ratings too time demanding for most. While avoidance of CSR ratings could be one solution 
to this problem, participation in decision-making forums which aim to streamline and 
standardize the various ratings might also help alleviate concerns about their reliability. The 
second group of actors includes the CSR rating agencies themselves. Here, too, much can be 
gained by working towards increased levels of coordination between CSR rating agencies and 
initiatives such as Science-Based Targets, which is a partnership between several nonprofit 
organizations that encourages companies to set carbon-emission reduction targets. Given the 
ambivalence found in our analysis, CSR rating agencies would also benefits from paying 
more attention to corporate responses to their ratings. Pragmatic rather than cynical 
engagement could be encouraged by emphasizing enhanced communication about 
methodologies (e.g. data used and peer group comparisons) and on how ratings may be used 
by investors to allocate capital (Atta-Darkua, Chambers, Dimson, Ran, & Yu, 2019). This 
approach might overcome some contestation and potentially increase microstatactivism 
within rated companies. Finally, multiplicity in the CSR metric domain has also been 
identified as a concern by policymakers, especially in the EU (HLEG, 2018). While the 
commercial nature of most CSR rating agencies may prohibit complete standardization 
according to a common rating template, the field has recently seen a trend towards 
consolidation, with smaller local rating agencies being taken over by larger mainstream 
financial intermediaries such as Morningstar and MSCI. As policymakers work to standardize 
sustainable finance as part of the EU Taxonomy Framework, they are advised to heed the 
systemic properties of metrics as well as their capacities to actually govern corporate efforts, 
allocate capital to leading CSR companies, and orient economic actors towards the search for 
the greatest common good. 
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Figure 1. Data structure 
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Figure 2. Managerial Responses to CSR ratings 
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Table 1. Respondent & company characteristics 
Characteristics n* % 
Job title/seniority Functional manager  33 44% 
Head of department or Senior Manager  29 38.7% 
(Senior) Vice President 13 17.3% 
Functional department 
responsible for responding 
to ratings 
CSR department 36 60% 
Investor Relations (IR) department or joint 
(CSR and IR) 
16 26.7% 
Other (e.g. Company Secretary, External 
affairs) 
8 13.3% 
There is a direct report to 
CEO or board level 
executives on performance 
in ratings 
Yes 34 56.7% 
No 26 43.3% 
Headquarter location by 
region 
Europe (incl. United Kingdom) 41 68.33% 
North-America 13 21.67% 
Other (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Brazil, Japan) 
6 10% 
Industry Retail & Services 18 30% 
Extractives & Utilities 17 28.3% 
Manufacturing & Chemicals 13 21.7% 
Other 12 20% 
Size (number of 
employees) 
< 125000 16 26.7% 
Between 12500 and 50000 16 26.7% 
Between 50000 and 100000 11 18.3% 
> 100000 17 28.3% 
Company CSR 
performance as rated by 
two or more rating 
agencies** 
Lagging  0  
Average 48 80% 
High  12 20% 
Discrepancy in rating from 
different rating agencies*** 
Yes 31 55.4% 
No 25 44.6% 
* We have 75 respondents in 63 interviews at 60 companies.  
** Given the well-known divergence in scores by different rating agencies (Berg, Koeble & Rigobon, 2019; 
Chatterji et al, 2016) we were not interested in actual scores, but an indication of whether the firm was 
generally considered a laggard, average or high performing firm. We followed MSCI and Asset4 classifications 
for converting scores into laggard/average/high performance categories; the conversion of Sustainalytics 
scores were based on percentiles: top 10% was scored as high; bottom 10% as laggard; 20-90th percentile as 
average.  
*** This discrepancy captures a firm scored as high performing by one rating agency, but average by another. 
CSR performance data from three rating agencies was available for 47 firms, 9 were covered by two rating 
agencies, and 4 firms were covered by only 1 of the rating agencies for which we had data.  
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Table 2. Overview of the four types of managerial responses to CSR ratings and supplementary illustrations 
Second order theme Description Illustrations 
GRUMBLING 
Complaining of 
commensuration overload 
Complaints about the work 
involved in responding to ratings 
They [CSR rating agencies] are in competition for one with the other. So, every year they are trying to create new 
fancy questions that companies have to respond to and that makes it very difficult for us. (MNC 12) 
And there do appear to be so many people now doing the same thing for the same people you know, that’s really the 
biggest bugbear that I’ve personally got. (MNC 28) 
Voicing concerns about 
commensuration utility 
Sceptical beliefs about the use of 
ratings by investors or other 
stakeholders 
A really good example of one [CSR rating] that is very widely known, very widely respected, but has moved into a 
place where it has less relevance, is the CDP, Carbon Disclosure Project. […] I have in 18 years of asking 
investors, have yet to find a single one that uses that output to make an investment decision. (MNC 17) 
… the perception is you know, the Dow Jones [Sustainability Index], best super-sector leader or whatever we got, 
that sounds fantastic, it’s good … internally, we thought that’s really, really good, it’s one metric how we can look 
at ourselves. But does the analyst community or the buyer side, the people that actually buy shares you know, one 
of our key stakeholders, do they view it in the same manner?  And do they view us in the same way that the 
questionnaire views us? (MNC 47) 
CONTESTING 
Contesting technical 
commensuration 
Criticizing the method and/or data 
used in CSR commensuration  
They just take what’s in the media, churn it all out again and they send questionnaires to us or say, ‘This is what 
we’re coming up with.’ We go back to them and say, ‘No, you’re misrepresenting us,’ we get into an argument. 
(MNC 10) 
Some of these things about ticking a box and saying the right word, and I think too much of them are about what you 
say, and not about what you do. […] I can’t even remember now what the word was, but because we didn’t use a 
specific word we were going to be penalised a number of points. (MNC 8) 
Contesting cognitive 
commensuration 
Contesting membership to a 
specific category of 
commensuration 
 
We are lumped into a sector that doesn’t quite fit for us. [...] to really be reflective of our company it is very hard for 
these rating agencies to understand what we do. (MNC 4) 
We do retail for our customers and we produce energy. So, we have the upstream, downstream, but not that middle 
part of the business anymore. So, we were kept in the gas distribution sector on the indices, against our direct 
wishes. Because it was a complete mismatch to the nature of our business, so we actually did fall of the Dow 
Jones for 2008-9. (MNC 2) 
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Table 2. Overview of the four types of managerial responses to CSR ratings and supplementary illustrations (continued) 
Second order theme Description Illustrations 
CHERRY-PICKING 
Benefitting from the 
plurality of ratings 
Selective responding to only certain 
ratings agencies 
We wouldn’t necessarily respond to every questionnaire that came through our door. So the ones that we 
absolutely do are the ones for the F4G profile, the Dow Jones Sustainability report, and the Carbon disclosure 
project. (MNC 2) 
The ones that we are very well aware of, like EIRIS, is associated to all these companies, so we responded to that. 
And the larger ones, Domini, KLD, Risk Metrics, that are some of the larger players, we respond positive. 
There is a lot of smaller ones where we haven’t responded or just sent them over something, saying here is a 
copy of the CSR report. (MNC 26) 
Gaming by selecting ratings 
inputs and outputs 
Providing incomplete / limited data 
and communicating or reporting on 
selected aspects of ratings 
There are companies that are rated, when you see the numbers that are behind for the criteria, it covers maybe only 
30 or 40 % of their activities. (MNC 49) 
So we try to temper what we give and we try to be as helpful as we can to you know, Dow Jones, the FTSE4Good 
and for other compilers of indices but not necessarily going to the lengths that they might want us to go to. 
(MNC 19) 
MICRO-STATACTIVISM 
Mobilizing comparative 
ordering for change 
Using the ratings to benchmark 
against peers 
Is somebody else doing something that we would benefit from? You know, is there another company out there in a 
similar line of work, one of our peers, that we could learn from? (MNC 28) 
Well ratings are a good basis for that, so we can check out where our strengths and weaknesses are. On the whole, 
we can say that we are quite strong compared to our peer group in the environmental aspect. And we’re in the 
middle about … in the middle of our peer group within social aspects. And that is mainly due to the fact that we 
have only started to deal with end consumers in 2005. (MNC 2) 
Enrolling ratings in 
calculative lobbying 
Using the rating to raise awareness 
of upper-echelons and to lobby for 
resourcing CSR 
I may have referred [the ratings] in the past, as an indication of you know, what we need to do to meet best 
practice or meet internationally accepted benchmarks. I do use it as a point of influence. (MNC 58) 
I think having a researcher at your back kind of, kind of helps to pull the strings together in the company. So it’s a 
good way of saying here, we want to have this information also gathered for the investment community and 
they are asking us these specific things. It’s not only a thing we are doing here for us but also something that is 
important for a broader audience. (MNC 55) 
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Appendix A. Covariance between the four dimensions 
 
Dimensions Grumbling Contestation Cherry picking 
Contestation 
0.586   
Cherry picking 
1.730 1.247  
Stat-activism 
0.546 2.022 2.210 
 
Note: Sample covariance based on total number of coded interview passages for each dimension. Co-variances 
illustrating ‘pragmatic’ and ‘cynical’ modes of engagement with CSR ratings are greyed. We focus on these 
modes because they represent ambivalent engagement using both mobilization and resistance responses.  
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Endotes 
i Different combinations of distinct terms are used in the literature to describe the two facets of the phenomenon 
of interest. On one hand, CSR, Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) issues and/or corporate sustainability 
have been used as either synonymous or distinct concepts (see, e.g. Bansal & Song, 2017) to account for 
corporate activities that focus on stakeholders broadly defined and aimed at enhancing social welfare (Barnett, 
2007). On the other hand, the rankings in this domain have been referred to under different labels in 
management (Rindova et al., 2018) and social sciences (Mennicken & Espeland, 2019), usually to describe 
quantified forms of comparative evaluations between organizations: ratings, lists, league tables, benchmarks, 
badges of honor, standards or certifications (e.g. Gehman & Grimes, 2017). Consistent with our (broad) 
definition, we use ‘CSR ratings’ in this paper as an umbrella term.  
ii All CSR ratings rely on publicly disclosed company reporting of CSR data, and some ratings solicit further 
information through a questionnaire. Although participation in rating is theoretically voluntary, complete 
avoidance of being rated is only possible by not disclosing CSR related data publicly, which is unlikely to be 
considered acceptable for large MNCs. 
iii This quote was lifted from the official website of one of our case companies. The company is not revealed 
here to preserve anonymity. 
iv We thank our Acting Editor for this insight. 
v Calculations of the statistical significance of all frequencies across respondent and organizational 
characteristics are available from the authors upon request. 
                                               
